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In this study, we examine the initiation and evolution of interfirm learning in interfirm R&D 
relationships. Based on in-depth case studies, we suggest that the process of learning in 
interfirm R&D relationships consists of different challenges: 1) initiating technological 
knowledge transfer, 2) continuing technological knowledge transfer, and 3) moving towards 
the joint creation of new technological knowledge. Our findings identify conditions needed to 
initiate knowledge transfer: the presence of legal knowledge transfer clauses, overlapping 
skills and equipment, fragile trust and organizational similarity. The continuance of 
knowledge exchange implies complementary modes of collaborating characterized by sharing 
technologies which are oriented towards different applications. Joint knowledge creation 
implies convergence on the level of applications which only becomes feasible when prior 
knowledge exchange processes have generated resilient levels of trust. These observations 
point to the relevance of conceiving and organizing interfirm R&D relationships in a time-
phased, differentiated manner.  
 




Transferring and Creating Technological Knowledge in Interfirm R&D Relationships: 
The Initiation and Evolution of Interfirm Learning 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Interfirm R&D relationships are increasingly suggested as an important mechanism to acquire 
new technological capabilities (e.g. Hagedoorn 2002; Tidd et al. 2002). In this paper, we 
define interfirm R&D collaboration as a formalized link between two or more independent 
organizations characterized by interdependent R&D activities. Interfirm learning can take on 
the form of transferring existing knowledge from one organization to another, and of jointly 
creating new knowledge (Larsson et al. 1998; Lubatkin et al. 2001; Podolny and Page 1998).  
Empirical research on learning in the specific context of interfirm R&D relationships 
has been dominated by cross-sectional studies, examining the impact of different factors on 
interfirm learning. These studies have provided evidence for the enabling role of conditions 
such as equity governance structures (Chen 2004; Mowery et al. 1996), overlapping 
technological skills (Lane and Lubatkin 1998; Mowery et al. 1996), trust (Cheng 2004), 
cultural similarity (Mowery et al. 1996), and organizational similarity (Lane and Lubatkin 
1998) for interfirm learning to occur. However, the conceptualization of interfirm learning in 
these studies has been limited to the form of transferring existing knowledge, ignoring the 
form of joint creation of new knowledge (Lubatkin et al. 2001). In addition, because of the 
studies’ cross sectional nature, insights on the dynamics of learning within interfirm R&D 
relationships are limited. Although scholars in this field (e.g. Ariño and de la Torre 1998; Doz 
1996; Ring and Van de Ven 1994; Van de Ven and Walker 1984) have stressed that an 
interfirm relationship is a gradual dynamic process that is continually reshaped and recreated, 
longitudinal studies examining the evolution of learning in interfirm R&D relationships are  
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rare. The study of Hamel (1991) is a notable exception in this respect. However, this study 
also only focused on interfirm learning as the transfer of existing knowledge between 
partners.  
This study intends to contribute to a fine-grained understanding of learning in 
interfirm R&D relationships by examining both transfer of existing knowledge and joint 
creation of new knowledge and by studying both the initiation and the evolution of interfirm 
learning. In order to do so, we rely on a longitudinal study of three interfirm R&D 
relationships that occurred within one technological trajectory in which one industrial 
company collaborated with different partners. The analysis of this case study is structured 
along two research questions: 1) how does the presence of particular conditions facilitate the 
initiation of interfirm learning? and 2) how and under which conditions does interfirm 
learning evolves over time? This research allows us to identify conditions that have not yet 
been addressed in previous research as well as to examine the relevance of conditions as the 
interfirm relationship evolves. In this way we follow the suggestion of Mowery et al. (1996) 
to engage in research that looks at the complexity of learning dynamics in interfirm 
relationships. 
The paper follows an inductive logic and is organized in five sections. First, we 
position our study within the existing alliance literature, further arguing the need to examine 
the complexity of interfirm learning. We then discuss the research design and the setting of 
our longitudinal study. In the respectively third and fourth section, we address our two 
research questions and formulate propositions about the conditions influencing the initiation 
and evolution of both transfer and creation of knowledge in interfirm R&D relationships. To 






To position our study, we first extend on the phenomenon of interfirm learning. We then 
discuss more in-depth the conditions that are identified by previous research as facilitating 
interfirm learning in R&D relationships. We subsequently extend on why adopting a dynamic 
view on the process of interfirm learning seems appropriate.  
 
Defining Interfirm Learning 
In the alliance literature, several forms of interfirm learning have been identified. A first form 
of learning essentially involves the transfer of existing knowledge from one organization to 
another (e.g. Kale et al. 2000; Mowery et al. 1996; Muthusamy and White 2005). Such 
learning results in a private benefit for firms that participate in interfirm relationships 
(Khanna et al. 1998). Second, several researchers (e.g. Larsson et al. 1998; Lubatkin et al. 
2001; Podolny and Page 1998) argued that interfirm learning can also generate common 
benefits. These researchers refer to interfirm learning as the process of jointly creating new 
knowledge. Where the transfer of existing knowledge requires partners to act as either 
‘novice’ or ‘expert’, the joint creation of new knowledge asks for partners to act as ‘co-
researcher’ or ‘co-inventor’ (Lubatkin et al. 2001). Third, researchers (e.g. Inkpen and Currall 
2004; Doz 1996; Ariño and de la Torre 1998) also referred to learning when partners - in the 
context of their existing interfirm relationships – acquire experience and know-how on how to 
manage the collaboration process. Such learning is seen as critical to sustain interfirm 
relationships (Delmestri 1998; Dyer and Singh 1998; Uzzi 1997; Kale et al. 2000). Fourth, the 
notion of learning is used to denote how an individual firm learns how to manage its interfirm 
relationships, and build what has been referred to as alliance capability (Draulans et al. 2003; 
Kale et al. 2002; Parise and Casher 2003).  
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  In this study, we focus on the first two forms of interfirm learning, namely the transfer 
of existing knowledge from one organization to another and the joint creation of new 
knowledge. Given the scope of the study, we do not examine the other two forms of interfirm 
learning. 
. 
Conditions that Facilitate Interfirm Learning 
To establish interfirm learning, two dimensions need to be present: transparency and 
receptivity (Larsson et al. 1998). Transparency refers to partners’ motivation and ability to 
disclose knowledge while receptivity refers to partners’ motivation and ability to absorb the 
disclosed knowledge by another partner. The literature on interfirm R&D relationships 
suggests that motivational as well as ability barriers might jeopardize the presence of 
transparency and receptivity within interfirm R&D relationships. First, the technological 
uncertainty that characterizes R&D partnerships creates exchange hazards (Oxley and 
Sampson 2004; Poppo and Zenger 2002). According to transaction cost theory (Williamson 
1985), opportunistic behavior therefore is likely to occur in this kind of collaboration. 
Partners consequently may be hesitant to disclose knowledge to other partners, avoiding that 
these latter abuse the R&D relationship for their own private benefit (Hamel 1991; Gerwin 
2004; Khanna et al. 1998). Second, technological knowledge is to some extent tacit and/or 
embedded within a specific context (Doz and Hamel 1997; Teece 2002). Several researchers 
(i.e. Hamel 1991; Larsson et al. 1998; Simonin 1999) have argued that the more tacit the 
disclosed knowledge, the more difficult it is to absorb and communicate in interfirm 
relationships. In sum, while the risk of opportunistic behavior threatens the willingness to 
disclose technological knowledge, the tacit nature of this knowledge hampers the ability to 
absorb and communicate it within interfirm R&D relationships.  
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Previous research has further identified five conditions of the interfirm R&D 
relationships that influence interfirm learning: equity governance structures, overlapping 
technological skills, trust, cultural similarity, and organizational similarity. We now briefly 
discuss these conditions but note again that interfirm learning in these studies refers to only 
one type of interfirm learning e.g. the transfer of existing knowledge from one organization to 
another. First, interfirm governance structures in terms of equity versus non-equity were 
found to strongly influence learning in interfirm R&D relationships (Chen 2004; Mowery et 
al. 1996). Equity governance structures include joint ventures, minority and majority 
participations; non-equity governance structures refer to all other cooperative arrangements 
not involving equity exchange (e.g. co-development agreement, technology sharing 
agreement) (Tsang 2000). This research indicated that equity governance structures support 
greater and more effective transfer of technological knowledge. Informed largely by 
transaction cost economics, the theoretical reasoning for this relationship is that equity 
governance structures create a mutual hostage situation through ex ante commitments to an 
alliance, reducing the incentives to behave opportunistically and promoting more active 
involvements of the partners (Dyer and Singh 1998; Kogut 1988; Pisano 1990; Williamson 
1991). 
  Several researchers however have criticized the transaction cost economics 
perspective on interfirm collaboration for its singular focus on partner opportunism 
(Muthusamy and White 2005). Applying social exchange theory (Blau 1964), they argued that 
a sense of trust is essential for the transfer of knowledge (Gulati 1995; Larson 1992; Ring and 
Van de Ven 1992; Zaheer and Venkatraman 1995). Trust refers to ‘a psychological state 
comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the 
intentions or behavior of another’ (Rousseau et al. 1998: 395). The studies of Kale et al. 
(2000) and Muthusamy and White (2005) demonstrated the positive effect of trust on  
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interfirm learning as trust tends to encourage and facilitate wide-ranging, continuous and 
intense contact between individual members of interfirm partners. Chen (2004) provided 
statistical evidence for this argument in the specific context of interfirm R&D relationships.  
  The presence of overlapping technological skills has been identified as a third 
condition that facilitates learning in interfirm R&D relationships. Mowery et al. (1996) 
showed that a firm’s ability to absorb capabilities from its partner depends on the pre-alliance 
similarity between the two firms’ patent portfolios. In a similar vein, Lane and Lubatkin 
(1998) found that partners, who share the same research communities, are more performant in 
terms of interfirm learning. These studies seem to confirm Cohen and Levinthal’s (1990) 
argument on absorptive capacity: in order to absorb technological knowledge, a firm needs to 
have considerable in-house expertise that overlaps the technology activities of its external 
partners. 
The fourth condition that is argued to stimulate learning in interfirm R&D 
relationships is cultural similarity. Mowery et al. (1996) found that U.S. firms’ R&D 
partnerships with non-U.S. firms resulted in lower levels of interfirm learning than those 
involving only U.S. companies. This finding is consistent with the large amount of research 
on international strategic alliances (e.g. Lam 1997; Inkpen 1997; Parkhe 1991; Pucik 1988; 
Tiemessen et al. 1997) which has argued that differences in terms of language, customs, and 
traditions, have the potential to negatively affect the process of interfirm learning.  
Differences between partners go beyond differences of nationalities; they also include 
differences in organizational culture. As the counterpart of cultural similarity, organizational 
similarity represents the degree of resemblance between the partners’ business practices, 
institutional heritage, and organizational culture (Simonin, 1999). Lane and Lubatkin (1998) 
provided evidence for the importance of organizational similarity. In specific, they found that 
the presence of social context similarities (i.e. similarity of management formalization,  
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management centralization, and compensation practices) had a positive influence on interfirm 
learning in R&D relationships.  
Building on this previous research, a first purpose of this study is to examine to what 
extent the outlined conditions are still relevant when a broader definition of interfirm learning 
is taken. As indicated above, we consider two forms of interfirm learning – the transfer of 
existing knowledge as well as the joint creation of new knowledge – and examine which 
conditions facilitate both forms of interfirm learning.  
 
The Evolution of Interfirm Learning 
Although interfirm learning may be stimulated by the above identified conditions, interfirm 
relationships are likely to change over time. Collaboration among different partners is ‘a 
gradual dynamic process that is continually reshaped and recreated by the actions and 
symbolic interpretations of individuals’ (Van de Ven and Walker 1984: 604). Interfirm 
relationships are described as sequences of negotiation, commitment, and execution stages 
(Ring and Van de Ven 1994), as learning, re-evaluation, and adaptation cycles (Ariño and de 
la Torre 1998; Doz 1996), or as punctuated equilibrium processes, where terms of 
relationships are established during relatively short divergent periods followed by longer 
convergent periods to carry out the agreements made (Venkatraman et al. 1999).  
Taking a dynamic perspective, scholars have argued the likelihood of change in 
transparency and receptivity over time. First, the motivation to disclose technological 
knowledge can evolve in both negative and positive direction. Some authors (Khanna et al. 
1998; Larsson et al. 1998; Hamel 1991) argued that, as interfirm relationships evolve over 
time, the temptation of giving less and taking more becomes greater. Doz (1996), on the other 
hand, observed that, as companies passed through positive series of learning-action-reaction 
loops, trust between the partners increased, allowing for the widening up of the exchange to  
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some underlying core technologies. This argument corresponds with the trust literature (e.g. 
Lewicki and Bunker 1996; Jones and George 1998; Newell and Swan 2000; Ring 1997), 
arguing that trust evolves in different phases, affecting the activities taking place. At the start 
of collaborative relationships, trust will be of a fragile nature. In these circumstances, parties 
are willing to transact with each other, as long as each behaves appropriately (Ring 1997). 
During later phases, when one party signals positive expectations of favorable attitudes to 
another and the other reciprocates those expectations, trust may spiral up towards more 
resilient modes. Within situations of resilient trust each party’s trustworthiness is based on 
confidence in the other’s values, backed up by empirical evidence derived from repeated 
behavioral interactions (Jones and George 1998). Such resilient trust provides individuals 
with the assurance that knowledge and information will be used for the greater good and that 
one need not to exercise power or enforce contractual arrangements to protect one’s own 
interests (Ring 1997).  
Not only the motivation to disclose knowledge, but also the motivation to absorb 
knowledge is likely to change. Several authors (i.e. Hamel 1991; Makhija and Ganesh 1997) 
indicated that, as one partner has successfully absorbed its desired knowledge from the other 
partner, its motivation to continue absorbing knowledge from the latter partner is likely to 
decrease, changing partner’s bargaining power or even threatening the continuation of the 
interfirm relationship.  
Partner’s ability to absorb and communicate technological knowledge may also 
change over time in interfirm relationships. Several researchers (Delmestri 1998; Dyer and 
Singh 1998; Uzzi 1997) suggested that, as the interfirm relationship evolves, partners develop 
interfirm routines. Dyer and Singh (1998: 665), for instance, argued that over time “partners 
get to know each other well enough to know who knows what and where critical expertise 
resides within each firm.” They referred to this process as the development of knowledge- 
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sharing routines, suggesting that these routines enhance partner-specific absorptive capacity. 
Lane and Lubatkin (1998) provided evidence for the positive influence of the presence of 
knowledge-sharing routines on interfirm learning. 
All above studies suggest that interfirm R&D relationships evolve over time but, 
except for Hamel’s study (1991), studies examining the longitudinal evolution of interfirm 
learning are lacking. The second purpose of this study is therefore to understand how and 
under which conditions learning in interfirm R&D relationships evolves. As we – in contrast 
to Hamel’s study (1991) – consider two forms of interfirm learning, we aim to examine how 
interfirm learning can evolve from transferring existing knowledge to jointly creating new 
knowledge.  
METHOD AND RESEARCH SETTING 
Research Design 
In this study, we adopt a longitudinal approach (Pettigrew 1979), examining retrospectively 
the process of interfirm learning in one setting. The study focuses on one technological 
trajectory in one company that, over a ten years time period, transformed from a technological 
opportunity to a global business activity. This technological trajectory consisted of three 
interfirm R&D relationships that form the unit of our analysis. This research design allows us 
to perform a comparative analysis of three interfirm relationships, an analysis that facilitates 
‘analytic generalization’ (Parkhe 1993; Yin 1984). Through selecting interfirm R&D 
collaborations that were part of the same technological trajectory, we minimize the influence 
of extraneous variation on our research findings (Eisenhardt 1989). In this study, all names of 






The company under study was MAT, a Belgian company working on a global scale, with 
products and systems based on metal transformation and advanced coatings. In the early 
nineties, the company had identified diamond-like coatings as a new promising technology to 
expand its Advanced Coatings division. At the end of 2003, one of its divisions, MAT 
Diamond, had succeeded in becoming the leading supplier of diamond-like coatings for a 
wide array of applications such as DVD molding, chip manufacturing and automotive 
components. During the development of this technological trajectory, MAT initiated interfirm 
collaborations with three different partners (see Table 1).  
____________________ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
____________________ 
MAT-USCOAT relationship. In 1994, MAT contacted USCOAT, a small US-based 
firm with a coating division, because USCOAT had developed its own diamond-like coating 
(DLX). Their DLX coating seemed to possess more flexible technological characteristics than 
diamond-like carbon (DLC) coatings which were more known in the industry. In 1995, MAT 
and USCOAT signed a Technology Evaluation Agreement that allowed MAT to evaluate the 
technological and commercial potential of USCOAT’s DLX technology. After exploring 
USCOAT’s diamond-like coating technology for two years, MAT became convinced that this 
technology could entail new industrial applications. At the end of 1997, MAT bought a 
license from USCOAT to exploit the DLX technology in Europe and proposed USCOAT to 
start up together a business activity of diamond-like coatings in Europe. In April 1998, the 
joint venture ‘MAT Diamond’ officially took off in which MAT possessed 60% of the shares, 
while USCOAT and RES (see below) possessed 20% of the shares. In 2000, due to financial  
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problems, USCOAT decided to sell not only its MAT Diamond shares, but also its entire 
coating division to MAT.  
MAT-RES relationship. When MAT decided to start a diamond-like coating business 
activity in 1997, they asked not only USCOAT to become a joint venture partner, but also 
RES, a Flemish research institute. RES had developed its own diamond-like carbon (DLC) 
technology in the past. By bringing together USCOAT’s DLX technology and RES’s DLC 
technology in the joint venture, MAT hoped that it had collected the necessary 
complementary technologies, competences and know-how to turn the development of 
diamond-like coatings into a commercial success. In exchange for transferring the DLC 
technology, RES received 20% of the MAT Diamond shares. In 2000 and 2001, when 
USCOAT had already left the joint venture, MAT Diamond’s activities were globally 
expanding. As this expansion required additional financial investments, MAT asked RES to 
jointly increase MAT Diamond’s working capital. However, RES’s board of directors was not 
willing to contribute financial resources to the JV. In 2002, MAT then preferred to buy out 
RES, making themselves the only decider on MAT Diamond’s future. In this way, MAT 
Diamond, originally a JV between three partners became a fully owned subsidiary of MAT. 
MAT-FRCOAT relationship. In 1999, when customers started to get interested in 
diamond like coatings, MAT realized that, to stay competitive in this emerging market, 
growth would be necessary. Next to internal expansion, collaboration with other partners was 
recognized as necessary in this respect. Scanning the industry to find interesting partners, 
MAT identified FRCOAT, a spin-off of a French university. This company was the main 
supplier of high quality DLC coatings for the Formula 1 industry. In November 2001, MAT 
took a minority participation in FRCOAT (48,7%). In July 2003, FRCOAT provided MAT 
the opportunity to increase its participation to 90% of all shares, making MAT the major 
shareholder of FRCOAT. At the same time, efforts were started to integrate FRCOAT’s  
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commercial, technological, and operational activities into the MAT Diamond Group, which at 
that time consisted of five, globally spread production plants.  
 USCOAT-RES  relationship.  Table 1 indicates that, between 1998 and 2000, 
USCOAT and RES had been partners in the same joint venture. However, no real interfirm 
relationship existed between these two firms as, apart from the managerial level, USCOAT 
and RES employees never met or had contact with each other. Because of the absence of 
collaborative activities between USCOAT and RES we do not consider this relationship in 
our study on interfirm learning. 
 
Data Collection and Analysis 
Data on the three interfirm relationships were collected in a retrospective way which allows 
for a much more focused data gathering process (Leonard-Barton 1990; Poole et al. 2002). At 
the same, unconsciously accepting respondent bias might occur in retrospective studies, 
leading to confusion about cause and effect relationships (Leonard-Barton 1990). We 
therefore triangulated our data, applying multiple data collection techniques, including 
interviews and document analysis.  
Following Pettigrew (1990) and Pentland (1999), we made an explicit distinction 
between different stages in our theory building process, representing an evolution from 
surface levels to deeper levels of data collection and analysis (see Table 2). In line with the 
observations made by Glaser and Strauss (1967); Pettigrew (1990) and Poole et al. (2000) this 
process involved iterative cycles of data collection and data analysis.  
____________________ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
____________________  
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  Construction of chronology of interfirm R&D relationships. In the first stage, we 
conducted unstructured interviews with two MAT managers who had been closely involved in 
the different interfirm R&D relationships. For each interfirm R&D relationship, we also 
studied relevant documents (i.e. contracts, reports of managerial and operational meetings, 
and publicly available data). Based on this information we applied a visual mapping strategy 
(Langley 1999; Miles and Huberman 1984) to construct a graphical representation of the 
chronology of the major events that had taken place within that each interfirm R&D 
relationship. 
  Writing of case study report. In the second stage, we conducted semi-structured 
interviews (Kvale 1996) with informants of the different involved organizations. We 
interviewed in total 19 persons (see Table 3). The structure of the interviews was derived 
from the chronology of the major events that we had identified in the previous stage. In the 
interviews, we asked respondents to describe these events and the kind of interaction these 
events triggered between the partners. The average length of the interviews was between one 
and two hours. All the interviews were taped and transcribed. The transcribed interviews were 
sent back to the interviewees to give them the opportunity to hand over additional comments.  
____________________ 
Insert Table 3 about here 
____________________ 
  After semi-structured interviews were completed, a case study report was written. In 
this case study report, we discussed in detail the initiation, the formal design, and the 
evolution of each interfirm R&D relationship. In these reports, we made extensive use of 
citations from interviews and documents. In this way, we wanted to stay very close to the 
original data, achieving a high level of accuracy (Weick 1979). According to Langley (1999), 
this analysis step can be seen as a narrative strategy for sensemaking in process research.   
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  Formulation of theoretical propositions. The purpose of the third stage was to 
interpret the narrative, developed in the previous stage, in order to come to theoretical 
propositions about the initiation and evolution of interfirm learning. A pattern-matching logic 
(Miles and Huberman 1984; Pauwels and Matthyssens 2004; Yin 1984) was applied in this 
respect.  
In order to identify patterns, data from different sources were coded. For each 
interfirm relationship, a coding matrix was constructed. The rows of the coding matrix 
represented categories that referred to 1) the conditions that act as learning facilitators in 
interfirm R&D relationships (i.e. governance structure, overlapping technological skills, trust, 
cultural and organizational similarity, and other not yet identified conditions), 2) the interfirm 
learning dimensions (i.e. motivation and ability to disclose technological knowledge; 
motivation and ability to absorb technological knowledge), and 3) the two forms of interfirm 
learning (i.e. transfer of existing technological knowledge and joint creation of new 
technological knowledge). The columns of this matrix represented the separate events that 
were identified in the previous stages. The data from the interviews and documents 
subsequently were coded into this matrix. In this way, we were able to construct for each 
interfirm relationship a chronological overview of the presence of the specific conditions, the 
evolution of the interfirm learning dimensions, and the accompanying interfirm learning 
forms (i.e. transfer and creation). Subsequently, we searched for causal patterns within each 
technological interfirm relationship. In specific, we looked for causal relationships between 
the identified conditions, interfirm learning dimensions, and different forms of interfirm 
learning. Next, we compared the causal patterns that had surfaced in the different 
technological interfirm relationships. Finally, the dominant causal patterns that emerged from 
this analysis were translated into several theoretical propositions. Together, the propositions  
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abstract the initiation and evolution of interfirm learning as observed in the different 
technological interfirm relationships.  
In sum, to come to theoretical sound propositions we applied a pattern matching logic 
that built upon recurring comparison of data, analytical findings, and theory, and explicitly 
allowed for feedback loops between coding, within-case and across-case analysis. 
 
INITIATING LEARNING IN  
INTERFIRM R&D RELATIONSHIPS  
In this section, we address our first research question on which particular conditions influence 
the initiation of interfirm learning. Examining the first year of the different interfirm R&D 
relationships, we identify the main events that triggered the disclosure and/or absorption of 
technological knowledge and interpret which conditions act as facilitators or inhibitors. In 
Table 4, 5 and 6 the following two aspects are presented for each interfirm relationship: a 
description of the main events and illustrations of the presence or absence of transparency and 
receptivity within these events.  
__________________________ 
Insert Table 4, 5 and 6 about here 
__________________________ 
 
Conditions that increase the motivation to disclose technological knowledge  
Previous cross-sectional research in the alliance literature (Chen 2004; Mowery et al. 1996) 
has argued that the presence of equity governance structures stimulates learning in interfirm 
R&D relationships. However, when explicitly considering the influence of equity structures 
on the motivation to disclose knowledge, our data seem to question the necessity of equity 
structures for initiating interfirm learning activities.   
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In the MAT-RES relationship, RES employees immediately started to disclose 
knowledge about RES’ DLC technology with MAT people who were responsible for the 
MAT Diamond activities (Event 1, Table 5). Although this relationship had an equity 
governance structure, RES interviewees did not mention this condition to explain their 
immediate willingness to disclose technological knowledge. Instead, the RES interviewees 
referred to the presence of specific contractual safeguards as explanation: 
“In the RES Technology Agreement, a number of annexes were present that described 
in detail which technology would be transferred to the joint venture. At that moment, 
we just had started working on another technology that had some linkages with the 
DLC technology. Through these annexes we could avoid that this new technology also 
would disappear.” (RES project manager) 
 
Besides the Joint Venture Agreement, both parties had signed a Technology 
Agreement that stipulated in detail which knowledge of RES would be transferred to the joint 
venture. According to the RES interviewees, this contract substantially reduced the risk that, 
apart form the DLC-related knowledge, other valuable knowledge would be transferred to the 
joint venture. This finding points out the importance of specific contractual safeguards, 
providing a framework for the exchange of knowledge, on the motivation to disclose 
knowledge. 
Our analysis of the MAT-USCOAT relationship seems to affirm the importance of 
such ‘legal knowledge transfer clauses’. Although this interfirm relationship was governed by 
a non-equity structure, technological knowledge was disclosed from the beginning. During 
the first technological meeting, knowledge about USCOAT’s DLX technology was openly 
exchanged from USCOAT to MAT (Event 1, Table 4). As reason for their willingness, 
USCOAT interviewees referred to the presence of specific contractual safeguards. At the start 
of their collaboration, both firms had signed a Technological Evaluation Agreement with 
specific clauses that prevented MAT to abuse the acquired technological knowledge. 
USCOAT consequently felt they could disclose knowledge about their DLX technology  
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without having to fear that MAT would abuse this information for its own personal benefits. 
One month later, a MAT engineer, visited USCOAT’s coating division for one month. During 
this month, USCOAT continued to disclose knowledge about their DLX technology by 
handing over samples of DLX coatings (Event 2, Table 3). From that moment, also MAT 
started showing transparency towards USCOAT. Results of characterizations conducted by 
MAT on the samples of DLX coatings were fed back to USCOAT. (Event 2, Table 4). To 
explain their willingness to disclose technological knowledge, MAT interviewees also 
referred to the presence of specific contractual safeguards. In the Technology Evaluation 
Contract, it was mentioned that both partners were obliged to disclose results concerning 
DLX-related technological activities. These findings consequently suggest that the presence 
of legal knowledge transfer clauses have a positive influence on the motivation to disclose 
knowledge even when an equity governance structure is absent.  
Our data on the MAT-RES relationship further question the necessary facilitating 
impact of an equity structure. Although this interfirm collaboration was characterized by an 
equity governance structure, disclosure of technological knowledge was only unilateral. MAT 
engineers and managers were very hesitant to disclose knowledge about their technology with 
RES engineers (Event 2, Table 5). Even when the joint venture became operational and RES 
engineers conducted characterizations of MAT Diamond coatings and assisted MAT’s sales 
persons in answering customers’ questions regarding technological specifications, MAT 
remained very unwilling to disclose technological knowledge. Asked for their reasons, MAT 
interviewees referred to their fear that RES engineers, being members of a research institute, 
would be tempted to talk about these new technological developments at conferences or 
workshops. This finding suggests that, the absence of organizational similarity between 
partners, even in the presence of equity governance structure, might prevent the disclosure of 
technological knowledge. We have to remark here that the organizational distance was much  
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smaller in the other observed interfirm R&D relationships. Although MAT was an established 
firm, MAT’s diamond-like coating activities were situated within a specific venture, 
characterized by a culture that was very similar to the entrepreneurial culture at USCOAT and 
FRCOAT.  
Finally, the MAT-FRCOAT relationship illustrates the positive influence of trust on 
the willingness to disclose knowledge. As the events in Table 6 indicate, this interfirm 
relationship was characterized by a willingness of both parties to openly disclose knowledge 
about each others coating technology (Event 1, Table 6) and technological fundamentals 
(Event 2, Table 6). Although an equity governance structure was present in this relationship, 
both MAT and FRCOAT people rather referred to the importance of trust to explain their 
willingness to disclose knowledge. In the interviews, MAT people especially mentioned their 
trust in the CEO of FRCOAT: 
“I thought of him as a very reliable person. I did not see him as a person who would 
cheat on me. I consequently had no problem in sharing knowledge with him.” (MAT 
manager) 
 
Also FRCOAT’s transparency was explained in terms of trust. When MAT first 
contacted the CEO of FRCOAT to initiate a partnership, his reaction was rather hesitant. A 
previous experience with one of MAT’s competitors had made him very suspicious about 
interfirm collaborations. To address this distrust, MAT showed him the corporate research 
center and its extensive R&D resources and organized meetings with the Director and General 
Manager of MAT Diamond to ensure him their dedication to the development of diamond-
like coatings. During the interview, the CEO of FRCOAT stressed that these initiatives made 
him confident in the good intentions of MAT and their commitment to a development project 
within this technological domain, stimulating his willingness to disclose technological 
knowledge.   
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To conclude, our analysis of these interfirm relationships tends to question the 
necessary relevance of equity governance structure and to affirm the importance of legal 
knowledge transfer clauses, organizational similarity and trust as conditions affecting the 
motivation to disclose knowledge at the beginning of interfirm R&D relationships. Legal 
knowledge transfer clauses seem to provide guarantees and a feeling of protection, even when 
an equity structure is absent (i.e. MAT-USCOAT relationship) and even when the disclosure 
of technological knowledge occurs unilateral (i.e. MAT-RES relationship). Besides legal 
knowledge transfer clauses, organizational similarity and trust are identified as important 
conditions. The absence of organizational similarity inhibits disclosure of knowledge, even if 
the interfirm collaboration is governed by an equity structure. The presence of trust tends to 
stimulate a bilateral disclosure of technological knowledge. We need to remark here that the 
feelings of trust were based on first perceptions of the values, attitudes, and emotions of the 
other partner. For instance, both MAT and FRCOAT people described the beginning of the 
interfirm R&D relationships as a ‘marriage d’essai’ (i.e. an attempt to marry), indicating that 
the trust between the partners was of a fragile nature. We therefore propose: 
Proposition 1a: Equity governance structures are neither a necessary nor a sufficient 
condition for partners to disclose knowledge. 
Proposition 1b: The presence of legal knowledge transfer clauses positively influences 
a partner’s motivation to disclose knowledge. 
Proposition 1c: The presence of fragile trust positively influences a partner’s 
motivation to disclose knowledge. 
Proposition 1d: The absence of organizational similarity negatively influences a 
partner’s motivation to disclose knowledge.  
 
Conditions that increase the ability to communicate and absorb technological knowledge 
Besides the willingness to disclose knowledge, it is argued that partners need to be able to 
communicate as well as absorb the disclosed knowledge to achieve interfirm learning 
(Larsson et al. 1998). While our data affirm this reasoning, they also suggest that the presence 
of overlapping technological skills - as argued by previous research (Lane and Lubatkin 1998;  
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Mowery et al. 1996) – is not the only guarantee for the presence of communicative and 
absorptive ability in interfirm R&D relationships.  
Analyzing the MAT-FRCOAT relationship, the interviewees explicitly stated that, 
although exchange of fundamental principles had taken place during the first six months, 
transfer of technology remained absent (Event 2, Table 6). Despite the presence of overlap in 
skills and experience in the field of diamond-like coatings between the MAT and FRCOAT 
engineers and their open disclosure of knowledge, the interviewees indicated that they were 
not able to arrive at a fine-grained understanding of the partner’s technology (Event 2, Table 
6), indicating the inability to absorb technological knowledge. After six months, the firms 
therefore decided to install each other’s coating systems: a FRCOAT coating system was 
installed at MAT, while a MAT coating system was installed at FRCOAT. According to both 
MAT and FRCOAT engineers, from then onwards, they became able to learn the partner’s 
technology (Event 3, Table 6). As one FRCOAT engineer expressed, it was the installation of 
each other’s technological equipment that was experienced as a fundamental step in 
generating the ability to communicate and absorb technological knowledge: 
‘You start to live with the technology. You try to do the same things. It is a very 
interesting step because in advance you think that everything works very well but, by 
using the machines, you start experiencing problems. When the coating system broke 
down, we telephoned people at MAT. This created new exchanges of information and 
new explanations. In this way, a detailed transfer of technology became possible 
(FRCOAT engineer) 
 
Similar dynamics were observed in the two other interfirm relationships where the 
ability to communicate and absorb knowledge was said to be present after the same 
equipment was installed at both firms. In the MAT-USCOAT collaboration, partners had 
signed a Unit Manufacturing Agreement that stipulated that MAT would ‘design and 
manufacture two identical units of a vacuum coating system suitable for the deposition of 
DLX coatings’ (Unit Manufacturing Agreement, p.1). In November 1995, these coating 
systems were installed at MAT and USCOAT and, according to the interviewees, allowed  
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engineers of both firms to “speak the same language” (Event 3, Table 4). In the case of the 
MAT-RES relationship, the Technology Agreement stipulated that a coating system, similar 
to the existing one at RES, would be installed at MAT during the first year of the 
collaboration. Again, the MAT interviewees stressed they were only able to become familiar 
with RES’s technology after the installation of this equipment at MAT (Event 3, Table 5).  
To conclude, we found evidence that the presence of overlapping technological skills 
is not always a sufficient condition for the ability to communicate and absorb technological 
knowledge. We observed that engineers were only able to understand the partner’s technology 
when they could apply their knowledge of diamond-like coating technology on coating 
systems that were equal or similar to the equipment of the partner. We therefore propose: 
Proposition 2: The positive influence of overlapping technological skills on a partner’s 
ability to communicate and absorb knowledge is magnified with the presence of 
similar technical equipment. 
 
  Before moving to the next section, three additional comments need to be made. First, 
we notice that, during this initiation phase, interfirm learning remained limited to the transfer 
of technological knowledge. Jointly creating new technological knowledge was not observed 
at this stage. Second, the absence of cultural similarity, discussed in previous research as an 
important condition (Mowery et al. 1996), was not experienced by the interviewees as a factor 
influencing interfirm learning. Although the interfirm R&D relationships under study here 
were collaborations between Belgian and American, and between Belgian and French culture, 
cultural differences were not mentioned as reasons to explain difficulties in initiating interfirm 
learning. Third, several scholars (e.g. Hamel 1991; Larsson et al. 1998) have stressed that 
partners also need to be motivated to absorb the disclosed knowledge. In all the studied 
interfirm relationships, this learning dimension was present as interviewees of all partners 
mentioned that, at the start of the interfirm relationship, they were very eager to learn more  
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about the partner’s technology. However, as will be illustrated below, the motivation to 
absorb knowledge drastically changed in some cases later on. 
 
THE EVOLUTION OF LEARNING IN INTERFIRM R&D RELATIONSHIPS 
In addressing our second research question on how interfirm learning evolves over time, we 
first describe this evolution for each interfirm relationship separately. Next, through 
comparing the three cases, we discuss which conditions seem to influence the evolution of 
interfirm learning. 
 
Evolution of Interfirm Learning in the MAT-USCOAT Relationship  
Our data suggest that the further evolution of the MAT-USCOAT relationship consists of two 
additional phases. While in a first phase, interfirm learning in terms of transferring existing 
knowledge between the partners remained present; it decreased in the second phase. Table 7 
provides a characterization of these two phases, also in terms of events that influenced the 
evolution of interfirm learning.  
____________________ 
Insert Table 7 about here 
____________________ 
Between 1995 and 1998, the collaboration between MAT and USCOAT remained 
effective in terms of transferring technological knowledge. The data suggest that transfer of 
existing knowledge continued between MAT and USCOAT. In this interfirm relationship, 
both partners started to experiment with the DLX technology, using the same technological 
equipment. However, while USCOAT searched for high-end DLX applications within the 
American micro-electronics market, MAT evaluated the feasibility of the DLX technology for 
industrial wear applications within the European market. The results of these distinct  
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experiments were discussed on regularly held technological meetings. As the interviews 
suggest, these meetings were characterized by a high motivation to disclose knowledge 
(Phase 1, Table 7). During the meetings, the presentation of results triggered detailed 
technological discussions among the engineers about how the technological potential of DLX 
coatings could be improved. In the interviews, these meetings also were described as very 
informative (Phase 1, Table 7) indicating that partners were also able to communicate and 
absorb relevant technological knowledge during these meetings. 
The MAT-USCOAT relationship began to change when MAT engineers started to 
realize the limitations of the DLX technology for industrial production. They started to 
experiment with combinations of the DLX and an alternative DLC technology. This 
combination of both technologies soon proved to have the best potential for industrialization. 
In 1998 MAT decided to focus on the development of combinations of the DLX and DLC 
technology. USCOAT was not involved in these developments. USCOAT engineers, although 
they were informed about MAT’s successful experiments in combining DLX and DLC, 
continued to focus on the development of pure DLX applications. USCOAT interviewees 
stressed that USCOAT’s management was not willing to invest in the development of DLC-
oriented coatings. After all, USCOAT had recently launched an intensive marketing campaign 
in the US to promote its DLX technology as an alternative for DLC coatings. If USCOAT 
would have started to look at DLC, they would have jeopardized their former marketing 
efforts. The decision of USCOAT’s management not to get involved in the development of 
this new DLX/DLC coating negatively influenced the amount of knowledge transfer between 
the partners. Both MAT and USCOAT interviewees mentioned that MAT engineers became 
less willing to engage in disclosing technological knowledge to USCOAT engineers (Phase 2, 
Table 7). Given the absence of a ‘common ground’, engineers were no longer interested in the  
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specific challenges faced by the other partner (Phase 2, Table 7), indicating that the 
motivation to absorb technological knowledge also decreased.  
 
Evolution of interfirm learning in the MAT-RES relationship 
In the MAT-RES relationship, we identified two phases, both representing a decline in 
knowledge transfer. Table 8 provides an overview of this evolution. 
____________________ 
Insert Table 8 about here 
____________________ 
After the first year, the transfer of RES’ DLC technology to MAT was completed. 
MAT, as stipulated in an R&D agreement, subsequently started to fund R&D projects at RES 
in order for them to continue research on DLC. MAT told RES engineers to exclusively focus 
on optimizing their original DLC technology in these R&D projects. However, through 
experimenting with RES’ DLC technology, MAT engineers already had learned that this 
technology was limited in terms of industrial products. Still, instead of involving RES 
engineers in the optimization of the combined DLX/DLC technology, MAT preferred to fund 
research projects at RES that focused on optimizing RES’s original DLC technology. At the 
same time, the MAT engineers, who also were very busy commercializing and expanding the 
MAT Diamond activities, showed little to no interest in these R&D projects (Phase 1, Table 
8). In other words, MAT’s motivation to absorb RES’ knowledge substantially decreased, 
reducing the transfer of knowledge from RES to MAT. In addition, in 2001 the appointment 
of a new CEO at RES implied a radical change in the strategic vision of RES on joint 
ventures. For instance, RES management refused to participate in additional financial 
investments to expand the activities of MAT Diamond. Also the subsequent negotiations to 
transfer RES’ shares to MAT were described in the interviews as very difficult. These  
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managerial tensions had its influence on the operational level. Although the R&D agreement 
stipulated that MAT would fund R&D projects for five years, RES initiated no more R&D 
projects on DLC. RES engineers also mentioned that the managerial tensions made them 
more cautious in disclosing technological knowledge to the MAT people (Phase 2, Table 8), 
indicating a decrease of the willingness to disclose knowledge from RES to MAT. In this 
way, knowledge transfers between the partners became completely absent. 
 
Evolution of Interfirm Learning in the MAT-FRCOAT Relationship 
Similar to the MAT-USCOAT relationship, knowledge transfer continued between MAT and 
FRCOAT in a first phase. However, while negative evolutions were observed in the MAT-
USCOAT relationship, this interfirm relationship evolved towards the joint creation of new 
knowledge (see Table 9). 
____________________ 
Insert Table 9 about here 
____________________ 
Between March 2002 and December 2002, MAT and FRCOAT continued to transfer 
knowledge. Making use of the exchanged technical equipment, engineers of both firms started 
to experiment with the partner’s technology. MAT engineers, on the one hand, investigated 
how the FRCOAT technology could improve the quality of MAT’s existing coating 
applications in the wear market. FRCOAT engineers, on the other hand, examined how they 
could apply MAT’s technology to improve their existing applications in the speed racing 
market. When one of the partners experienced new difficulties, ad hoc discussions occurred. 
As one MAT engineer describes, these discussions were open and fruitful (Phase 1, Table 9), 
suggesting the presence of valuable knowledge transfer.   
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At the end of 2002, due to a failure to develop an application for an important 
customer in the automotive industry, both firms realized that a new coating technology should 
be developed. This led to the initiation of the Adhere project, in which MAT and FRCOAT 
engineers jointly tried to develop a new technology that combined the positive characteristics 
of the MAT and FRCOAT technology. In this project, engineers of both partners not only had 
ad hoc discussions, but also worked shoulder to shoulder to develop a new coating. One 
FRCOAT interviewee mentioned that the joint R&D efforts triggered excessive information 
exchange (Phase 2, Table 9), allowing for the creation of new technological knowledge. At 
the end of 2003, the Adhere project was successfully completed. A new coating was jointly 
developed that combined the positive characteristics of the MAT and FRCOAT technology.  
 
Discussion: The Evolution of Interfirm Learning  
Our data suggest that interfirm R&D relationships can evolve in different ways. Besides, 
discontinuation, preserving the continuance of technological knowledge transfer and evolving 
towards the creation of new technological knowledge were observed.  
Conditions that facilitate the continuance of technological knowledge transfer. 
We observed that, in some cases at particular moments, partners were able to continue 
transferring technological knowledge, while, in another case and at other moments, 
technological knowledge transfer decreased. We argue that the complementary versus distinct 
nature of the scope of the partners’ R&D activities determines the degree to which 
continuance of technological knowledge transfers will occur.  
Our findings on the MAT-USCOAT and MAT-FRCOAT relationship suggest that a 
complementary scope of R&D activities tends to facilitate the continuance of technological 
knowledge transfer in interfirm R&D relationships. The main characteristic of this 
complementary scope seems to relate to the firms’ independent search for different market  
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applications while using and developing a shared technological platform. A MAT manager 
expressed this as follows: 
“If the R&D teams of USCOAT and MAT would do the same thing, they would all 
target the same markets, contact the same customers, and try to find solutions for the 
same applications. This is not efficient. Instead, it is good to make the R&D teams of 
the different partners accountable for specific markets and products. Long discussions 
about who has the best solution for particular problems are avoided. This, however, 
does not mean that they can not contact each other to exchange technical information. 
If one team has a problem, they can contact the other team to discuss these problems. 
But, in the end, individual teams are solely responsible for reaching their own 
objectives. Consequently, discussions in which both teams accuse each other of not 
doing what had to be done are avoided.” (MAT manager)  
 
Such a complementary scope of R&D activities in terms of market applications seems 
to increase accountability of individual R&D teams, overall efficiency and reduces the risk of 
competition. These factors, in turn, positively influence the willingness to exchange 
technological knowledge while the presence of a shared technological platform provides the 
optimal environment to continue communicating and absorbing technological knowledge. 
Because both partners focus on the same technologies, they are likely to have a fine-grained 
understanding of the partner’s technological activities and capabilities. 
  In contrast, when R&D activities do not share technology platforms one is likely to 
observe a decline in knowledge transfer between the partners. In the MAT-RES relationship, 
both partners explicitly focused on different technologies. As one RES engineer suggested, 
such separation reduced the likelihood that technological activities of one partner could have 
value for the other partner. 
“They [MAT] actually told us: ‘this is your process, try to improve it and try to scale it 
up.’ It would have been better if they had told us: ‘our process looks like this; you can 
start from this and try to improve it.’ When we would have defined R&D projects in 
that way, it would have been more efficient and more ideas would have emerged out 
of it.” (RES engineer) 
 
When the scope of the partners’ R&D activities is of a distinct nature, the motivation 
to absorb knowledge decreases and consequently jeopardizes the continuation of 
technological knowledge transfer. Similar dynamics were observed in the MAT-USCOAT  
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relationship. Although these partners had been able to continue to exchange technological 
knowledge for a substantive period, such knowledge transfers quickly disappeared after 
partners had decided to focus on different technologies. We therefore propose: 
Proposition 3a: If the scope of the partners’ activities is complementary -each 
organization works with the same technology on different market applications-, 
technological knowledge transfer is likely to continue.  
Proposition 3b: If the scope of the partners’ R&D activities is distinctive -each 
organization works with a different technology-, technological knowledge transfer is 
likely to decrease and even come to an end.  
 
 
Conditions that facilitate the joint creation of new technological knowledge. Within 
our case study, the cooperation between MAT and FRCOAT evolved towards joint 
knowledge creation. This evolution was related to a more convergent scope of not only the 
partner’s R&D activities but also their market applications:  
“In 2002 we worked on a large application for an important customer in the automotive 
industry. First we had tried to develop this application with limited resources in 
Belgium. This project was a failure because the customer told us that we were not able 
to deliver a coating that satisfied their needs. That was the moment that we understood 
that we needed to build one large R&D team. We needed to converge the MAT and 
FRCOAT technology to develop one technology that would combine the best 
characteristics of the two technologies.” (MAT project manager) 
 
The failure to develop an application for a specific customer made MAT and FRCOAT 
realize that they jointly needed to develop a new coating that combined the positive 
characteristics of both partners. Therefore, the Adhere project was initiated, oriented towards 
developing jointly a new application for one specific - shared - customer.   
These findings lead to – at first sight – contradictory observations. While pursuing 
distinctive market applications turned out to be beneficial for the continuance of technological 
knowledge transfer (proposition 3a), the movement towards joint knowledge creation seems 
to ask for convergence on the level of market applications. As argued within the previous 
section, distinctive market approaches reduce the risk of competition between collaborative 
partners, allowing for the continuation of technological knowledge transfer. However, as  
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knowledge transfer continued in the MAT-FRCOAT relationship, the need to protect against 
the threat of competition was reduced because of a sufficient amount of positive experiences, 
as suggested by a MAT engineer:  
“Before, this [Adhere] project could not have been initiated. However, now we found 
ourselves in an advanced phase of the collaboration… Because we successfully had 
disclosed technological knowledge for more than one year, we felt that a more structural 
collaboration on the technological level was possible.” (MAT manager) 
 
The MAT-FRCOAT relationship provides indications that partners need first-hand 
evidence of the other partners’ trustworthiness to evolve towards convergence on the level of 
market applications. This finding seems to correspond with Jones and George’s (1998: 539) 
argument that, only when partners have received empirical evidence of the other partner’s 
trustworthy behavior, the quality of the exchange relationship can fundamentally change and 
engaging in joint knowledge creation activities becomes feasible. In other words, once trust 
has spiraled up to more resilient levels, joint knowledge creation is possible. However, 
initiating a joint development project that enables joint creation implies – at least – one shared 
application, hence to some extent, convergence on the level of market applications.  
We therefore propose: 
Proposition 4a: Only to the extent that the scope of the partners’ activities is 
converging -each organization works with the same technology towards a similar 
application - interfirm R&D relationships are able to evolve towards joint knowledge 
creation.  
Proposition 4b: The evolution from a complementary to a convergent scope requires 
previous positive knowledge exchange experiences between partners in order to 
establish resilient trust. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this study was to contribute to the development of a more complex and 
dynamic view on learning in interfirm R&D collaboration through identifying conditions that, 
over time, affect transfer of existing knowledge and joint creation of new knowledge. In this 
concluding section, we first summarize the main findings of our study. Next, we focus on the  
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contributions of our study and discuss limitations as well as promising avenues for future 
research.  
 
Summary of Findings 
Based on an in-depth case study of three interfirm R&D relationships within one 
technological trajectory, we suggest that the process of learning in an interfirm R&D 
collaboration tends to consist of different phases: initiating technological knowledge transfer, 
continuing technological knowledge transfer, and moving towards the joint creation of new 
technological knowledge. For each of these three phases, different conditions seem to play a 
role.  
Regarding the initiation of technological knowledge transfer, the conditions of legal 
knowledge transfer clauses and conditional trust, rather than equity governance structure, 
positively influence the motivation to disclose knowledge of partners. Our data strongly 
indicate that, even when equity based governance structures are not present, organizations are 
willing to disclose technological knowledge as long as specific contractual safeguards that 
provide a framework for the exchange of knowledge are present. This finding is important, 
given Hagendoorn’s (2002) observation that, because of the flexibility of non-equity based 
governance structures, organizations tend to increasingly prefer this type of legal structure 
above an equity structure to govern R&D partnerships. Consistent with other research 
(Larsson et al., 1998), we found that organizations only get a fine-grained understanding of a 
partner’s technology when partners are able to communicate and absorb the tacit components 
of the technology involved. While previous research (i.e. Lane and Lubatkin 1998; Mowery et 
al. 1996) has emphasized the importance of overlapping technical skills, this study stresses 
the importance of sharing technical equipment in order to transfer sticky or tacit knowledge.  
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Finally, it became apparent that organizational similarity is more influential than cultural 
similarity regarding the initiation of knowledge transfer.  
After the initiation of technological knowledge transfer, interfirm R&D collaborations 
face the challenge to continue technological knowledge transfers. In this phase, the scope of 
the partners’ R&D activities strongly influences the organizations’ willingness to continue 
transferring knowledge. A complementary scope of R&D activities, whereby each 
organization works with the same technological platform on different market applications, 
was found to facilitate the continuance of knowledge transfer activities. If the scope of R&D 
activities is distinctive – each organization works on different technologies – interfirm 
knowledge transfer tends to dissolve.  
The following challenge is to move to a third phase in which new technological 
knowledge is jointly created. Our findings suggest that such joint knowledge creation requires 
convergence also on the level of market applications. Our data further indicate that past 
positive experiences – on the level of knowledge transfer activities – is required in order for 
convergence on the level of market applications to be effective. As such, these observations 
accentuate the relevance of stage based views on trust (e.g. Lewicki and Bunker 1996; Jones 
and George 1998; Newell and Swan 2000; Ring 1997) for understanding the dynamics of 
interfirm R&D relationships. 
 
Future Research and Limitations 
Through engaging in research that examines the complexity of learning dynamics in interfirm 
relationships, the insights of this study points to four directions for future research. While in 
the past several scholars (e.g. Chen 2004; Mowery et al. 1997) have focused on the influence 
of ownership structure (i.e. equity versus non-equity structure) on interfirm learning, our 
findings suggest that not the ownership structure per se, but rather the presence of specific  
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contractual safeguards influences the willingness to disclose knowledge. Following Gulati 
and Singh (1998) and Klein Woolthuis (1999), we therefore suggest a more fine-grained 
research of the impact of legal governance structures on interfirm collaboration. In specific, 
we encourage studies to examine the impact of specific contractual safeguards on the potential 
for interfirm learning.  
Second, we observed that the presence of legal knowledge transfer clauses as well as 
the presence of fragile trust positively influences a partner’s motivation to disclose 
technological knowledge. However, given the limited number of observed cases, we were not 
able to examine whether legal knowledge transfer clauses and trust should be regarded as 
complements or substitutes. Our study therefore supports the call of several scholars (e.g. 
Madhok 1995; Young-Ybarra and Wiersema 1999) to combine contractual-based approaches 
(i.e. transaction cost economics) with relational-based approaches (i.e. social exchange 
theory) to better understand the dynamics of interfirm collaboration. Recently, a number of 
studies (e.g. Garcia-Canal, Valdés-Llaneza and Arino 2003; Lui and Ngo 2004; Luo 2002; 
Poppo and Zenger 2002), have examined the combined effects of contractual and relational 
conditions on the performance of interfirm relationships. Future work that looks at the 
emergence of such effects in terms of learning would be very productive.  
  Third, existing research (Lane and Lubatkin 1998; Mowery et al. 1996) has argued 
that the amount of overlapping skills largely determines the ability to absorb knowledge in 
interfirm R&D relationships. Our study, however, indicates the relevance of not only 
overlapping skills but also the availability of similar equipment and the execution of 
complementary R&D activities by the partners as conditions facilitating the absorption and 
communication of technological knowledge. Except for the study of Carson et al. (2003), 
these factors have been neglected in explaining the success or failure of interfirm 
relationships, indicating a promising direction for further research.  
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Finally, past research on the dynamics of interfirm learning has focused on the transfer 
of knowledge between organizations (Lubatkin et al., 2001). In this study, we also examined 
the process of moving towards jointly creating new technological knowledge through which 
we were able to identify specific conditions that facilitate the continuation of knowledge 
transfer and those that facilitate the joint creation of new knowledge. Future research may 
benefit from including multiple forms of interfirm learning, examining how each form is 
related to a different phase in the interfirm relationship, and identifying its crucial challenges. 
As a final reflection, we point to the main limitation of this study. Our findings are 
based on an in-depth examination of a limited number of interfirm relationships in one 
technological trajectory. Although this research design allowed us to compare the three 
relationships with a minimum influence of extraneous variation, its findings are 
contextualized. Particular characteristics of the technological trajectory or the companies 
themselves influence the way in which the interfirm R&D relationships under study evolved. 
The development of a more general dynamic theory on interfirm R&D collaboration requires 
additional case studies in other contexts to fully understand how and to what extent different 
conditions affect different forms of interfirm learning and their evolvement over time. We 
hope our study inspires scholars to conceptualize interfirm relationships and interfirm 
learning as phased processes and to examine the critical points of attention for each phase.    
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Table 1: Chronology of the interfirm R&D relationships 
  ´95 ´96 ´97 ´98 ´99 ´00 ´01 ´02  ´03 
MAT-USCOAT relationship    
MAT-RES relationship      
MAT-FRCOAT relationship      
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Table 2: Overview of different stages of data collection and analysis 
Stage  Data Collection Technique   Data Analysis Technique  Output 
1  - Unstructured interviews 
- Analysis of documents  Visual mapping strategy 
Graphical representation of 
chronology of different interfirm 
R&D relationships 
2  Semi-structured interviews Narrative  strategy 
Case study report that in detail 
describes the events that shaped 
the interfirm R&D relationships 
3 
Feedback interviews with 
managers of involved 
companies 
Pattern-matching logic 
Theoretical propositions about the 
initiation and evolution of interfirm 
learning  
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Table 3: Overview of the interviews 
Company  Function of Interviewee  Number of 
Interviewees 
 
Corporate Manager  2 
Project Manager  2 
Engineer/Technician 2 
Sales Manager  1 
MAT 
Lawyer 1 
Corporate Manager  2 
Project Manager  2  RES 
Engineer/Technician 1 
Project Manager  1  USCOAT 
Engineer/Technician 3 
Corporate/Project Manager  1  FRCOAT 
Engineer/Technician 1 




Table 4: Initiation of transparency and receptivity in the MAT-USCOAT 
relationship 
 
Event 1:  
April 1995 
 
Event 2:  
May 1995 
 




meeting between MAT 
and USCOAT 
 
MAT’s project manager 
visits USCOAT plant 




Installation of joint DLX 






willingness to disclose 
knowledge at USCOAT 
 
“Initially there was a 








“Despite the risk of 
withholding 
information during this 
initial phase, they 
played it openly.” 
(MAT manager) 
Presence of willingness 
to disclose knowledge 
at MAT and USCOAT 
 
“He [MAT project 
manager] received lots 
of information about 
the coatings, about what 
they could be used for. 
We provided even 





“We got these samples 
analyzed…The 
exchange of these 
findings was open. 
(MAT engineer) ” 
 
 
Presence of  ability to 
communicate and absorb 
knowledge at MAT and 
USCOAT 
 
“Through the presence of 
these joint coating systems, 
everybody spoke the same 
language. This facilitated the 
discussion of specific 
problems.” (MAT manager) 
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Table 5: Initiation of transparency and receptivity in the MAT-RES relationship 
 
Event 1:  
Jan 1998 
 
Event 2:  
April 1998 




meetings between RES and 
MAT 
RES provides operational 
assistance to initiate 
operational activities in the 
joint venture 
 
Installation of a RES coating 





Presence of  willingness to 
disclose knowledge at RES 
 
“We passed on the set-up 
of the RES process as well 




Presence of willingness to 
disclose knowledge at RES 
and absence of willingness 
to disclose knowledge  at 
MAT 
 
“Regarding the exchange 





“We were not open about 
our technology towards 
RES to avoid an outflow of 
knowledge.” (MAT 
manager) 
Presence of ability to absorb 
knowledge at MAT 
 
“In this way, we were able to 
get familiar with the 
technology. It allowed us to 
observe the possibilities of it. 
We wanted to be able to 
imitate the DLC-characteristics 
of RES.” (MAT engineer)  
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FRCOAT and MAT 
Visits from engineers to 
partner’s production plant 
Installation of a FRCOAT 
coating system at MAT and a 






Presence of willingness 
to disclose knowledge 
at MAT and FRCOAT 
 
“I did not hide anything 
about FRCOAT’s 
process. Also the MAT 
people did not hide 
anything. During this 
first meeting, for 
instance, it became 
clear that there was an 
essential difference 






Presence of willingness to 
disclose knowledge at MAT 
and FRCOAT 
 
This was not really a 
transfer of technology but 




Absence of receptivity at 
MAT and FRCOAT 
 
“We received information 
about their coating systems 
and technology. However, 
we quickly realized that 
seeing the process on a 
blackboard or looking at 
how their engineers were 
turning the buttons of the 
machines would not be 
sufficient to learn about the 
technology.” (MAT project 
manager)’ 
Presence of ability to absorb 
and communicate knowledge at 
MAT and FRCOAT 
 
“This allowed both parties to 
get familiar with the technology 




 “For me this was the 
fundamental step in the 
collaboration: both parties 
started working with each 
others technology.” (FRCOAT 
engineer)’  
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Table 7: Evolution of interfirm learning in the MAT-USCOAT relationship 
  Phase 1: 1995-1998 
 
Phase 2: 1998-2000 
Events 
USCOAT and MAT both 
experiment with DLX technology 
for different applications in 
different markets. The results of 
these parallel experiments are 
regularly exchanged during 
technology steering committees.   
  
MAT decides to develop a new 
coating that combines DLX and DLC 
technology. Because of financial 
problems and sunk-cost investments, 
USCOAT’s CEO decides not to get 
involved in the development of this 
new coating. 
Evolution of interfirm 
learning 
 
Continuation of knowledge 
transfer 
 
“The exchange of findings was 
open. I did not have the feeling that 
information was withheld or that 
people did not want to tell certain 
things.” (MAT engineer) 
 
“There was a lot of sharing of 
information. The technical 
meetings were very informative.” 
(USCOAT project manager) 
Decrease of knowledge transfer 
 
“When we felt that the technology of 
USCOAT had its limitations, we 
became more reserved concerning 
new developments of other 
coatings.” (MAT manager) 
 
“A part of the frustration was also 
that we did not know what actually 
happened at MAT. We did not have 
all the information.” (USCOAT 
project manager) 
 
“I think gradually it became less and 
less clear what was happening.” 
(USCOAT project manager) 
 
“They worked on applications for the 
electronics industry where you had to 
put Fluor in the coatings. That was 
none of our business. There almost 





Table 8: Evolution of interfirm learning in the MAT-RES relationship 
  Phase 1: 1999-2001  Phase 2: 2001-2002 
Events 
MAT funds R&D projects at RES. 
Although MAT focuses on the 
optimization of its DLC/DLX coating, 
RES engineers are told to focus on the 
optimization of the original DLC 
technology. 
 
Appointment of new CEO at RES, 
causing tensions between RES and 
MAT on the managerial level. 
Evolution of interfirm 
learning 
Decrease of knowledge transfer 
 
“I remember that we really had to 
insist on sitting together to discuss the 
research. Those people [MAT 
engineers] were busy with other 
things.” (RES project manager) 
Decrease of knowledge transfer 
 
“In these circumstances, you no 
longer sit together and discuss the 
main strategies. You are a bit more 
careful.” (RES project manager) 
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Table 9: Evolution of interfirm learning in the MAT-FRCOAT relationship 
  Phase 1: March 2002 – Dec 2002 
 
Phase 2: Dec 2002 – Dec 2003 
Events 
MAT and FRCOAT experiment with 
each others technology for different 
applications in different markets. These 
parallel experiments trigger ad hoc 
discussions between engineers. 
Because of the failure of a project for a 
specific customer in the automotive 
industry, the Adhere project is initiated. 
In this project, MAT and FRCOAT 
jointly try to develop a new coating that 
combines the positive characteristics of 





Continuation of knowledge transfer 
 
“It was a very open discussion with them. 
There was no confrontation. The 
experience of everybody was put on the 
table. In this way, you can start to find 
solutions.” (MAT engineer) 
 
 
Emergence of joint knowledge creation 
 
“In this project engineers of the 
different teams work closely together. I 
think that the fact that we shared a 
specific project, which was important 
for each partner, stimulated extensive 
information exchange… As a result, the 
newest coating actually is the synthesis 
of the positive aspects of both the MAT 
and the FRCOAT technology, which, at 
the beginning, were actually 
competitive technologies. The two 
technologies have met each other.” 
(FRCOAT CEO) 
 
 
 